A Theory of Trust in Institutions

In this talk, I offer a way to think about institutional trust. We routinely rely on institutions such as courts, agencies, universities, and the press, yet we cannot verify, on a case-by-case basis, the quality of their outputs. Institutions manage this problem by adopting a mandate, meaning a publicly understood role that lets outsiders form reasonable expectations without auditing every decision. However, trust in a mandate does more than reassure the public that institutional insiders are doing their jobs. It also turns the institution into a platform that amplifies whatever insiders do. That amplification creates pressure to use the institution for adjacent, non-mandated objectives. As influence grows, that pressure can pull activity beyond the mandate and erode trust. The lecture develops this mechanism, which I call elite drift, explains why simply trying harder at the core mission is often an unstable fix, and draws out what the framework implies for institutional design questions that lawyers care about, including independence and accountability, and how spillovers in trust can arise across peer institutions. Attorneys will benefit from this lecture by gaining a sharper framework for diagnosing institutional failure, anticipating trust-related vulnerabilities, and advising clients or organizations on how to maintain legitimacy in complex governance environments.

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